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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

Competitive dynamics research has established the important impact that the level of firm
competitive activity has on rival response and firm performance. Less understood, however, are
inputs that influence firm activity, specifically, the extent to which firms reflexively repeat prior
activity versus selectively taking actions. Drawing from the awareness–motivation–capability
framework, we develop and test theory that firm decision makers are not only predisposed to
behave reflexively, but are also influenced by contextual factors, suggesting cognitive selection.
Utilizing a longitudinal sample of marketing activity of 58 firms and 2,164 firm–rival dyads in 11
industries, we find that firms undertake both reflexive and selective competitive processes.
Positive effects of prior levels of activity are moderated by the firm’s own prior performance, as
well as the rivals’ similarity and industry standing.
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Many key questions in strategic management research are
directed at explaining variation in firm behavior (Ocasio,
1997; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). Traditional
explanations assume firm behavior is determined by characteristics of the industry in which firms compete (Caves
& Porter, 1977) or the set of resources they possess
(Barney, 1986, 1991; Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen,
2010). More dynamic perspectives on firm behavior, on
the other hand, highlight the internal development of
routines that firms tend to repeat and reuse (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982) or susceptibility
to external forces, which leads firms to imitate behaviors
of others (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haunschild &
Miner, 1997). While the tenets of these two dynamic
views are generally accepted, much less is understood
about their boundary conditions. Specifically, when will
a firm repeat activity it has undertaken in the past or
imitate behaviors of others, as opposed to acting more
selectively? In this study, we shed light on this compound
question by drawing on literature that examines dynamics
of firm behavior within the context of interfirm rivalry
(e.g., Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001; Chen, 1996; Chen &
MacMillan, 1992; Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith,
2008; D’Aveni, 1994). In particular, we use the awareness–motivation–capability (AMC) perspective developed by Chen and colleagues (Chen, 1996; Chen, Su, &
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Tsai, 2007) to examine the tension between a firm’s tendency to automatically repeat its own past competitive
activity or imitate others versus its capability and desire to
be more selective and less predictable.
A large body of research into firm-level experience
posits changes in firms’ future behaviors based on their
past actions (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002). For example,
empirical studies have related firm future behavior to
prior experiences with mergers and acquisitions (Baum,
Li, & Usher, 2000; Haleblian & Finklestein, 1999;
Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; Hayward, 2002);
previous alliances (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005;
Simonin, 1997); and market penetration (Bingham &
Eisenhardt, 2011; Chuang & Baum, 2003; Zahra,
Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). The core theory of these studies
is that firms satisfice when making decisions about
future behavior because they are limited in their information-processing skills, and therefore their behavior is
path dependent and routine based (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982). In short, because the
knowledge base of firms is determined in large part by
experience with prior behaviors, firms and their managers are more likely to repeat past actions, and their
future behavior will change slowly and incrementally
(Baum et al., 2000).
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Another type of reflexive process is imitation, where
changes in firm activity are based on the past activity of
competitors (Baum et al., 2000; Levitt & March, 1988).
Empirical studies of firm-level imitation have demonstrated that firms adopt a set of behaviors from participation in interfirm innovation networks with others
(Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), through multimarket contact with rivals (Korn & Baum, 1999), and
from patterns of global expansion by others (Henisz &
Delios, 2001). These studies often draw on institutional
theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haunschild &
Miner, 1997) to argue that, faced with uncertainty and
ambiguity, firms will observe the behavior of competitors to provide them with direction regarding their own
future bundle of actions (Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, &
Smith, 2008). In other words, firms constantly observe
competitors and then adjust their own future behaviors
accordingly (Baum et al., 2000).
The perspectives on experience and imitation both
assume that information-processing capabilities of top
managers are limited, and, as a consequence, a firm’s
future activity is predominately driven by automatic or
reflexive processes. This yields levels of competitive
activity that are closely tied to the firm’s own past
experience, or the activity of competitors. Because
firms and their managers are limited in the capabilities
necessary to acquire, distribute, interpret, and retain
information and knowledge (Huber, 1991), the set of
actions they undertake in the future tends to be routine
based, constrained to local or problem-oriented search,
and prone to programmed interpretation (Levitt &
March, 1988). Therefore, the behavior of firms and
their managers may not be well planned, nor necessarily provide increased organizational effectiveness
(Huber, 1991). Indeed, it is often reflexive, due to conditioning from the environment or history of the firm.
This reflexive or deterministic perspective is rooted
in individual-level research conducted in the 1970s,
where scholars initially concluded that all behavior is
externally determined (Bandura, 1975). However, social
cognitive research has ultimately concluded that cognitive aids to facilitate behavior can overcome limits to
individual information processing, and, as a consequence, behavior can be selective (Bandura, 1986).
This perspective is important because it emphasizes
that human agents are self-determinant and, as such,
1
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can make their own choices. Applied to the management field and, more specifically, to competitive strategy, it would suggest that managers’ cognitive abilities
allow them to proactively engage in forethought, set
goals, make forward-looking plans, and engage in a
level of competitive activity that moves the firm toward
anticipated future goals and outcomes (Smith & Cao,
2007). Along these lines, Gavetti and Levinthal (2000)
simulated forward-looking, cognitive, and experiential
search that is not solely dependent on the past or the
behavior of others. Miner and Haunschild (1995) also
showed that a firm is capable of distinguishing among
targets of its imitative behavior.
The literature on competitive dynamics, which captures discrete measures of the levels of firm competitive
activity, offers rich potential to investigate the role of
firm reflexive and selective processes. To date, empirical research on interfirm rivalry has failed to address
the degree to which firms and their managers discriminate and are selective in their action choices. What
would cause one firm to imitate some rivals, but not
others, is yet unclear. Or when might a firm reflexively
repeat its past actions versus act in a more unpredictable manner? The AMC perspective in management
theory, however, provides important insight regarding
the drivers of firm competitive behavior (Chen, 1996).
Specifically, this perspective maintains that firms vary
in their awareness, motivation, and capability to engage
other firms in rivalry. Drawing from this conceptual
framework, we develop and test the theory that firm
decision makers are not only predisposed to reflexively
engage in a level of competitive activity that is based on
past experience or the activity of others, but are also
influenced by a set of contextual factors that demonstrate cognitive selection, yielding a level of activity that
is more strategic and less predictable.
Our theory begins with two baseline hypotheses that
suggest firm competitive activity is deterministic or
reflexive.1 That is, we hypothesize about the impact of
prior focal firm and rival behavior, such as the level of
marketing activity, including past promotional and
advertising campaigns, on the focal firm’s future marketing activity. We then introduce the notion that
competitive activity is at times selective, defined as
behavior that is directed or altered by managerial capabilities and attentional focus. We analyze the

The term reflexive is also found in the book The Alchemy of Finance, by George Soros (1987). In that original work, Soros used the term
in connection with the theory of reflexivity to describe the recursive interplay between observers of events and events being
observed. More recently, the Journal of Economic Methodology devoted a special issue to the concepts and development of the theory;
interested readers may refer to a paper by Soros (2013) included in the issue for a greater summary and clarification. Our separate use
of the term here derives more directly from dictionary definitions associated with reflex actions in describing the tendency of firms to
repeat past behaviors. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for calling attention to the other use of the term.
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relationship between competitive activity and contextual conditions such as prior focal firm performance
and rival performance, industry leadership, and similarity in industry standing. Specifically, we apply the
conceptual building blocks of the AMC perspective to
explain the moderating influence of awareness, motivation, and capability on reflexive activity.
To empirically investigate our theory, we performed
structured content analysis on published accounts of
the observable activities of firms over time. Consistent
with prior research that examined firm behavior in
specific behavioral settings, including mergers and
acquisitions (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Haleblian
et al., 2006), alliance activity (Hoang & Rothaermel,
2005; Simonin, 1997), and product introduction activity
(Katila, 2002; Li, Maggitti, Smith, Tesluk, & Katila,
2013), we examined discrete levels of marketing activity. Our empirical setting is composed of the aggregate
marketing activities of 2,164 industry-specific, firm–
rival dyads from 11 industries ranging from hard
goods manufacturers and general retailers to utility
providers and national supermarkets over a 6-year
period.
We make several specific contributions to prior
research on the dynamics of firm behavior. First, we
add to the firm evolutionary literature that views firm
behavior and routines as path dependent and repetitive
by using the AMC framework to identify boundary
conditions that explain why some firms are capable of
overcoming a tendency to automatically repeat prior
levels of competitive activity. Similarly, our use of the
AMC framework also enables us to explore conditions
that predict firm mimetic tendencies, as described by
institutional theorists. As such, we contribute to unraveling tension in the literature between reflexive and
selective competitive activity by identifying key contextual conditions. We also contribute to the competitive

Figure 1. Conceptual model of reflexive and selective behaviors.

dynamics literature, specifically in the area of competitor analysis (Chen, 1996; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991), in
that our framework speaks directly to the conditions
that would allow firms to predict future levels of competitive activity. By identifying conditions that suggest a
firm may repeat past competitive activity or imitate
rivals, we enhance the ability to predict impending
behavior. Finally, our application of AMC helps further
articulate this framework as a useful concept to explain
firm competitive actions in a variety of applications.
We now develop these arguments and then test them as
follows.

Reflexive behavior: Focal firm and rival prior
activity level
We model a firm’s competitive activity in the context of
interfirm rivalry that involves both reflexive and selective processes (see Figure 1). We begin our description
of the model with a discussion of reflexive competitive
activity. Organizational studies have long argued that a
firm’s information processing is routine based, inertial,
bound by historical precedent, and not necessarily
intentional (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levitt & March,
1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Defined here as reflexive, these processes predictably yield future levels of
competitive activity that are closely coupled with the
firm’s own past activity and that of its rivals.
The tendency of the firm to draw from its experience
with prior behavior is a core element of organizational
research. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, p. 29) speculated that with little regard for ongoing events in the
competitive environment, firms create “links in time”
that they described as “the explicit organizational practices that address past, present, and future time horizons and the transitions between them.” The authors
posited that firms bridge past and future activity
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through explicit practices and sufficiently rigid routines. The host of research that applies this reflexive
perspective spans a number of strategic settings, including mergers and acquisitions (Haleblian & Finkelstein,
1999; Hayward, 2002), alliances (Simonin, 1997), and
market penetration (Zahra et al., 2000). The consistent
underlying premise across these studies is that routinebased behavior preconditions a firm to repeat the
actions of its own past.
The research on reflexive processes typically casts their
repetitive nature as somewhat dysfunctional. Levitt and
March (1988) applied the term “competency traps” to
describe processes that often hold firms in perpetual
dependence on procedures that produced prior behaviors.
A firm tends to fixate on a familiar course of action or level
of activity that tightly aligns with its own prior actions
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). As processes within the firm
advance with successive repetition, the firm becomes
increasingly reliant upon a constrained set of actions.
Likewise, the evolutionary perspective of adaptation identifies inertial forces acting on the firm that ties its past to its
subsequent behavior. Barnett, Greve, and Park (1994) suggest that larger, established firms tend to be less adaptive.
They argue that absent environmental shocks, a firm will
only incrementally vary its activity over time and will be
subject to repeating its prior actions (Barnett & Sorenson,
2002). Consistent with extant findings, we expect that the
focal firm’s future level of competitive activity will be a
function of its own prior activity level.
Studies also find evidence that the predisposition
toward reflexive behavior, influenced by the past, exists
irrespective of outcomes—whether or not past behavior
proved correct. The firm settles into a set of actions
partially from its successes but also from its failures.
Henderson and Cool (2003) suggest that there are reflexive tendencies even in the face of a growing record of
poor outcomes. Also, Leonard-Barton (1995) suggests
that core competencies of firms may give way to “core
rigidities,” wherein managers fall into a set of mindless
routines that are almost impervious to new inputs from
the environment. The nature of the firm’s past behavior
becomes a more formidable influence even as it grows
more rigid (Barnett & Sorenson, 2002; Leonard-Barton,
1995). This accumulation of past actions informs the
firm’s ongoing future behavior and is manifested in
close coupling between prior levels of activity and the
firm’s subsequent activity level. All of the preceding
arguments give rise to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The prior level of focal firm competitive
activity will be positively related to the level of future
focal firm competitive activity.

75

Complementing the organizational experience perspective, there is a more externally directed literature, which
posits that organizations, situated in a community of organizations, imitate each other (Cyert & March, 1963;
Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988; Derfus,
Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008). Beyond its own past, a
firm’s future behaviors are influenced by behavior it
observes from others (Davis & Greve, 1997; Kraatz, 1998;
Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001). Moreover, the literature on
institutional and competitive forces suggests that mimetic
processes of adoption result from decisions that are not
fully rational (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fiol & O’Connor,
2003; Levitt & March, 1988) and stresses the role that social
influences play in the tendency to follow the behaviors of
others (Davis & Greve, 1997; Kraatz, 1998; Kraatz &
Moore, 2002; Rao & Drazin, 2002). Abrahamson and
Rosenkopf (1993, pp. 488, 513) describe an effect of bandwagon pressures whereby an organization adopts behavior
because of its popularity, not because of its own assessment
of the behavior’s value to the organization. They argue that
the pressures fueling bandwagon behavior may be so great
that even an organization that has determined the behavior
to be ill-suited will often nonetheless adopt it.
Empirical studies find support for the existence of such
bandwagon effects. For example, in a study of major creditrating agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poors,
Vaaler and McNamara (2004) find that acute uncertainty
causes agencies to match the overly pessimistic rating
practices of their competitors. The authors concluded
that the overwhelming bandwagon pressures among competing agencies caused the firms to rate emerging-market
sovereigns substantially lower than objective criteria would
prescribe. In like manner, actions on Wall Street preceding
the advent of the 2007–2009 recession arguably point to
similar bandwagon effects that led to overvaluation of
mortgage securities. In an extensive review of research in
matching behaviors, Miner and Haunschild (1995) also
show evidence across studies that organizations demonstrate a strong propensity toward replication of the common actions of others. Similarly, Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm,
and Smith (2008) demonstrates the tendency of media
organizations to behave similarly to their competitors
when deciding what firms to cover in their publications.
Thus, the theoretical foundation and abundance of
research findings suggest that visible behaviors of others
are readily manifested in a focal firm’s subsequent
behaviors:
Hypothesis 2: The prior level of rival competitive
activity will be positively related to the level of future
focal firm competitive activity.
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Selective behavior: Focal firm and rival
contextual factors
In contrast to an organization that is destined to reflexively repeat the past or automatically imitate others, the
awareness–motivation–capability (AMC) perspective
provides a conceptual framework to examine a firm’s
selective behavior. This management perspective, with
roots in social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1989),
offers a powerful lens for predicting a firm’s propensity
to engage a rival in competitive interaction (Chen, 1996).
The key precursors to interfirm rivalry, as described by
the AMC perspective, include the firm’s levels of awareness, motivation, and capability (Chen, Su, & Tsai,
2007). That is, a firm will respond to a rival’s actions
when the firm is aware of the rival, motivated to take
action, and capable of mounting a response. The firm
tends to be aware of a particular rival when that rival
shares similarities with the firm, such as similarities in
resource endowment and market share, or when the
rival manifests some considerable degree of market
power, such as market leadership. However, awareness
alone, in the AMC sense, is not sufficient to trigger the
engagement of the firm in tactical interaction with a
rival. The firm is likely motivated to respond to a rival
in a market leadership position, but will only do so if it
has adequate operational capability.
These conceptual principles of the AMC perspective have been applied in recent strategic management studies, with important results (Chen et al.,
2007; Yu & Cannella, 2007). In a study of airline
competition, Chen et al. (2007) found that the precursors to rivalry had significant impact on perceptions of competitive tension within the focal firm’s
top management team. Those airline competitors
identified as chief rivals by the firm’s executives
were associated with greater indicators of awareness,
motivation, and capability. Also, in an empirical
study of multinational firms, Yu and Cannella
(2007) demonstrated that AMC variables influenced
global rivalry, in that home and host country characteristics likewise had an impact on awareness,
motivation, and capability. In the current study, we
argue that these precursors serve as a basis for a
firm’s selective or strategic focus on the competitive
activity of particular rivals.
A number of researchers have called for the examination of selective behavioral mechanisms beyond
automatic responses to experience and vicarious stimuli (Shipton, 2006; Spender, 2008; Zollo & Winter,
2002). Although the theoretical basis for the matching
of past behaviors or the widespread behaviors of
others has been well established (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983; Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Levitt &
March, 1988), the foundation for how firms distinguish or select among potential imitation targets has
not yet been fully clarified. The AMC perspective
provides a basis to argue that firms can behave selectively in certain settings based on the level of their
awareness, motivation, and capability to do so. Using
the perspective, we link human agency to competitive
behaviors to provide deeper insight into firms’ selectivity. Thus, consistent with a firm’s awareness, motivation and capability, managers direct the firm along
a set of contextual factors that influence the firm’s
subsequent behavior.

Contextual factors
The AMC perspective provides the theoretical lens to
focus on firm capabilities and the attention of individuals who make decisions regarding future behavior. In
harmony with early work by Child (1972) to account
for the role of organizational decision makers, we stress
the fact that organizations consist of such human
agents at the helm. Beyond the firm’s expected inclination to follow the actions of the past, whether its own
actions or the actions of rivals, managers guide internal
processes by situating the attention and cognition of
firm actors (Ocasio, 1997). From this perspective, the
firm’s behavior is the net effect of the internal focus of
organizational actors along a range of potential imitation targets. Locke and Latham (1990) suggest that
managers direct a process that filters the firm’s experience based on alignment with organizational goals.
Managers gain an enhanced understanding of causal
linkages between the behaviors and resultant outcomes
of both themselves and rivals and use this experience to
select what level of activity the focal firm should engage
in in the future (Zollo & Winter, 2002). This selective
behavior is a matter of context—including the firm’s
performance toward those goals, the performance of
the firm’s rivals, and its relative market position vis-àvis those rivals. We theorize not only that a firm will
reflexively follow past experience or simply attempt to
replicate behavior of any and all rivals, but that the
firm’s capability, awareness, and motivation will manifest in certain circumstances. In this research we focus
on four context areas that may affect a firm’s selective
behavior and moderate its future competitive activity
level: prior focal firm performance, rival firm performance, rival industry leadership, and similarity in
industry standing. We use these contextual variables
to theorize about the interplay of reflexive and selective
behavior.
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Focal-firm performance
A firm’s past performance will have an influence on the
extent to which the firm is able to overcome its tendency
to repeat its own prior activity by influencing its capability to engage in slack search. Per behavioral theory of
the firm, increased performance allows for broad experimentation and organizational search that would otherwise not be available to those firms experiencing low
performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003). Slack
search, or search “that would not be approved in the face
of scarcity but [has] strong subunit support,” may lead to
more effective and innovative behavioral processes
(Cyert & March, 1963, p. 279). Increased performance
should then relax the firm’s dependence upon its past
behavior. In a study of public hospitals, Salge (2011)
demonstrated that those firms with greater financial
attributes concentrated greater efforts on pursuing
novel behaviors. A high-performing firm with greater
slack may be more likely to deploy resources to understand and differentiate between effective and ineffective
past levels of competitive activity. Routine-based arguments (Nelson & Winter, 1982) suggest that firms in
general may tend toward repeating past activity, whereas
the greater slack available to higher performing firms
allows for the development of tools to interpret past and
rival activity and make adjustments. In short, the relationship between a focal firm’s past level of competitive
activity and future activity will be weaker in high performance, and likewise, the relationship between rivals’
past level of activity and the focal firm’s future activity
will also be weaker in high-performing firms. Thus, the
high-performing firm is more capable and therefore is
less bound by its own past activity, and better equipped
to engage rivals as a consequence.
Hypothesis 3a: Focal firm performance will negatively
moderate the relationship between the prior level of
focal firm competitive activity and the future level of
focal firm competitive activity.
Hypothesis 3b: Focal firm performance will negatively
moderate the relationship between the prior level of
rival competitive activity and the future level of focal
firm competitive activity.

Rival performance and industry standing
We also contend that firms will be aware of and motivated to select a particular subset of external rivals as
imitation models. While imitation fundamentally
relates to a firm’s ability to generally recognize and
process the behaviors of others and their internal procedures that produce such behaviors, sociocognitive
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underpinnings to the AMC perspective describe a process that is model driven (Bandura, 1986). Managers, as
firm actors, select models from within the broader
environment. In an environment where multiple rivals
simultaneously take actions, managers, bounded in
their capacity for external focus (Ocasio, 1997), selectively attend to and become aware of some of them
more so than others. Hence the firm’s awareness and
motivation is necessarily narrowed to only some salient
subset of rivals as models.
Fiske and Taylor (1991) describe how attention is one
of the first stages in information processing and note
that without attention, nothing else can happen (1991,
p. 245). The selected target of attention is largely determined by the degree to which the observer is aware of its
presence and motivated to focus on it. Something motivates focus, or is salient, if it stands out from other
stimuli in a particular context (Derfus, Maggitti,
Grimm, & Smith, 2008). Characteristics that make stimuli salient include their extremity (Taylor & Fiske,
1975) and frequency (Crocker & McGraw, 1984;
Hawkins & Hoch, 1992; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1982). Extreme and/or frequently observed stimuli tend
to dominate in a particular context and are thus more
prone to be selected for attention (Bonardi & Keim,
2005).
Awareness and motivation by a firm’s managers of
select rivals as salient environmental models allows the
firm to interpret external events (Chattopadhyay, Glick,
& Huber, 2001; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), understand
and frame external actions (Huber, 1991; Nutt, 1998),
and conserve and retrieve from its organizational memory (Levitt & March, 1988). Over time, managers build
increasingly accurate cognitive maps of only a subset of
select rivals. Rival decision rules, information processing, and framing become clearer to the firm as it
continually tweaks and clarifies its collective understanding of model-selected rival behaviors.
Observation of the most salient rivals as models
allows the firm to predict, with increasing accuracy,
internal and external triggers that lead rivals to act.
Porac, Howard, and Baden-Fuller (1989) refer to cognitive communities surrounding rivals that influence
the development of their decision triggers. From
repeated direct interactions, the firm hones its understanding of model rivals’ cognitive communities that
may include rival supplier relationships, relationships
with advertising agencies, customer contracts, state regulations, or other external triggers. The quality of
observed actions of its selected rivals depends upon its
understanding of their operating heuristics and their
cognitive triggers. Awareness of those external triggers
enhances the firm’s ability to recreate the comparable
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heuristics necessary to replicate the modeled activity of
selected rivals. In a study of competition and evolution
in the Illinois banking industry, Barnett et al. (1994)
showed that those firms that actively engaged direct
rivals adapted best.
Research on strategic groups also suggests that a
firm is more keenly aware of some rivals in its industry
than it is of others (Porter, 1980; Reger & Huff, 1993).
Rather than a mere reflexive processing of information
from the common practices of all rivals, the firm discriminates and selects among behavioral models. Rivals
at the extreme in terms of high performance will be
salient to a focal firm and will thus be the target of its
awareness and motivation for action. In addition, the
activity of more proximate and similar rivals allows for
more frequent and richer observation that is less prone
to causal ambiguity; as such, these rival actions may be
more recognizable to the focal firm’s managers and
such managers will be motivated to incorporate them
into the firm’s subsequent behavior. Consequently,
more so than the firm’s broad vicarious observations,
the actions of the selected subset of rivals provide
appreciable influence on the firm because of increased
awareness and motivation. Some level of uncertainty
will undoubtedly persist even about the most understood rivals, as demonstrated by Bloodgood and
Bauershchmidt (2002) in their study of competitive
knowledge across manufacturing plants. Nonetheless,
the firm’s understanding of these salient rivals is
strengthened through competitive interactions and
focused observations. As such, the causal linkages to
their behaviors, though not perfectly understood, are
less ambiguous to the firm. We predict that the firm
will be most aware of and motivated to imitate the level
of competitive activity of those particular rivals that are
high performers (Levitt & March, 1988), that hold a
high market share position in the industry (Haunschild
& Miner, 1997; Korn & Baum, 1999), and that are most
similar to the firm (Baum et al., 2000).
First, we expect that high performing rivals will have
greater influence on the firm as they draw greater awareness and motivation. Levitt and March (1988) highlight the
influence of high-performing rivals by suggesting that in
competitive situations, powerful organizations effectively
“create their own environment” to which others must
adapt. High-performing rivals will trigger greater awareness and motivation by observers because their performance places them at the extreme of others in the
industry, thus potentially magnifying the focal firm’s
focus on the level of their competitive activity. Haveman’s
(1993) study of market entry showed that for firms diversifying into new markets, the greater the performance of
rivals, the greater is their motivating influence. Rival high

return on assets unwittingly drew attention to the attractiveness of their behavior. Also, effective actions by a given
rival are those that destroy competitor advantages and
generate rival gains (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Derfus,
Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008). High performance by
that rival then is observable evidence of success in its
competitive behavior. The behaviors of high-performing
rivals are also likely to receive broad media coverage and
may be frequently cited as exemplars in a given industry—
and thus be especially motivating to observing managers.
The higher performing rival is an especially salient model
for the firm. Therefore, the firm is more inclined to replicate the behavior level of rivals that perform well in the
competitive environment.
Second, rivals at the highest industry standing, such
as the industry market share leader, will increase awareness and motivation by the focal firm, and thereby
draw greater attentional focus. Theory suggests that
the firm’s awareness is strongest among those rivals of
high industry standing. Networking studies suggest that
higher standing rivals tend to be the most salient.
Podolny and Stuart (1995) showed in a study of technology innovations that high standing indeed drives
subsequent behavior among other innovators. The
focal firm will more readily select the rival that is the
industry market leader as a model of behavior. A simulation by Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) investigated a moderating influence on imitation that is tied
to the size and network centrality of contextual models.
The findings showed a significantly enhanced bandwagon effect. Also, within the competition research
domain, Korn and Baum (1999) found that among an
array of rival attributes, firms were motivated by the
industry standing of rivals. Thus, the subsets of rivals
with high industry standing may serve as prime contextual models for a firm’s selective behavior.
Third, as a matter of similarity between a focal firm
and rivals, investigation into new market entry in the
study by Haveman (1993) showed evidence of the
influence of “size-localized” similarity on imitation by
the firm. Until the new market approaches competitive
saturation, firms outside the new market will follow
their size-wise peers to imitate. Therefore, like the
impact of industry leadership, rivals that are more
similar to the focal firm in industry standing will
draw greater awareness and motivation by the focal
firm, and thereby be more likely to influence its subsequent level of competitive activity. As such, the firm
will be more influenced by these similar rivals than by
dissimilar rivals.
Hypothesis 4a: Rival performance will positively moderate the relationship between the prior level of rival
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competitive activity and the future level of focal firm
competitive activity.
Hypothesis 4b: Rival industry leadership will positively
moderate the relationship between the prior level of
rival competitive activity and the future level of focal
firm competitive activity.
Hypothesis 4c: Rival-firm similarity in industry standing will positively moderate the relationship between
the prior level of rival competitive activity and the
future level of focal firm competitive activity.

Data and methods
Sample
Consistent with prior research that examined firm
behavior in specific settings, such as mergers and acquisitions (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Haleblian et al.,
2006; Hayward, 2002), alliance activity (Hoang &
Rothaermel, 2005; Simonin, 1997), and product introduction activity (Katila, 2002; Li et al., 2013), we focus
specifically on the marketing activity of firms.
Marketing activity consists of discrete actions, including promotions and advertising actions taken by each
firm each year. These actions tend to be broadly observable, and therefore especially provide the basis to
expect that firms and rivals may be cognizant of one
another.2 Our study focuses on the marketing activity
of firms in multiple industries across multiple years of
observation. An important criterion in selecting the
sample was that firms and rivals were operating in the
same geographic markets so that their specific actions
could be directly connected. We therefore focused
solely on the marketing activity of firms in the U.S.
market. Also, to facilitate the matching of the marketing activity of each firm with its performance only in
that market, firms needed to be publicly traded, have
distinct single-business entities, and report performance figures for that entity. Therefore, we included
in our sample only those industries where 70% or more
of industry sales were generated by firms that were
public, had a distinct single-business entity competing
in the specific U.S. market, and reported performance
relative to that U.S. market. The industries used in the
sample include appliances, athletic footwear, auto manufacturing, beer, book superstores, general retail,
2
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lumber and hardware, national supermarkets, office
supplies, steel, and telephone service. On average, the
firms included in our study accounted for 87% of their
respective industry sales.
In harmony with the body of literature on competitive behavior, actions are defined as specific and observable moves initiated by a firm to defend or improve its
relative market position (Smith, Grimm, & Gannon,
1992, p. 1). To build a comprehensive set of actions,
structured content analyses were conducted on newspaper and trade magazine article accounts of observable
market activities, including promotional and advertising campaigns and market positioning. This approach
is consistent with previous studies of competitive behavior, including Miller and Chen (1994), and follows the
procedure for structure content analysis in Jauch,
Osborn, and Martin (1980). Financial data were collected from SEC and other public reports. Our procedure resulted in the identification of 2,796 distinct
marketing actions taken in respective markets by 58
companies in 11 industries across 6 years. In our analysis, the 58 companies operate both as firms and rivals.
For the sake of clarity, firm refers to the focal company
consistently throughout this analysis, and rival refers to
every other company within the focal company’s
industry.

Data
To test the hypothesized relationships, the data are
organized in two ways: (1) a data set with aggregated
industry actions and (2) a dyadic data set consisting of
dyads of each firm with each pair-wise rival. First, the
industry aggregated data set consisted of 348 total lines
of data for companies that included annual, detailed
accounts of marketing actions and both firm-specific
and industry financials. The arrangement of this data
set was consistent with procedures followed in the
development of data sets in extant competitive
dynamics studies (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, &
Derfus, 2006; Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008).
This data set is used to test both the behavioral effects
of a firm’s own experience and behavioral effects from
a firm’s imitation of aggregated industry rivals (Basdeo
et al., 2006). Second, the original data set was rearranged into dyads of each firm to each rival per industry—yielding 2,164 lines of detailed data of both firm
and each pair-wise rival. The dyad construction is

It is notable that rather than corporate-level strategic actions, such as acquisitions or alliances, this study purposefully focuses on
other discrete competitive actions, consistent with product introduction activity (Katila, 2002; Li et al., 2013). The choice to focus on
the discrete marketing activity of firms represents a conservative test of theory, given that firm behaviors such as mergers and
acquisitions may more expectedly draw attention because of their potential impact on industry structure.

80

D. L. MAJOR ET AL.

similar to Baum and Korn’s (1996, 1999) pairing of
firms to multimarket rivals (however, unlike the citypairings of Gimeno and Woo [1996] in that rather than
city-to-city dyads, dyads in this study comprise firm-torival pairs). The dyads preserve the detail of each firm’s
aggregate activity per year, while also allowing for tests
of each individual rival effect. It is used here to evaluate
the effects of imitation of specific rivals in the context
of the moderators of this selective behavior. Details of
the operationalization of each of the hypothesized relationships follow.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in the testing of all hypotheses
is the marketing activity of the focal firm i in each year
j. Marketing activity consisted of a count of all marketing actions taken by the firm—including marketing and
advertising campaigns, marketing promotions and
sponsorships, and product announcements—in each
given year. Construction of the measure follows consistently with previous competitive dynamic studies
(Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999).
This count variable is the primary measure of future
behavior in a given year used throughout the study.
Independent variables
For the testing of the hypothesized causal relationships,
each of the independent variables was lagged by 1 year.
The variables included measures of marketing activity,
performance, industry leadership, and similarity in
industry standing.
Main effects
The main effect of the focal firm’s prior activity on future
behavior was measured using a lagged count of marketing actions for each focal organization. As with focal
firm prior behavior, the main effect of rival prior market
activity on future firm behavior was measured using a
lagged count of marketing actions for each rival. We also
constructed a second measure, an aggregate measure of
industry market activity. The lagged industry activity
included a count of marketing actions for all companies
in the industry, excluding the focal firm.
Moderating effects
For the moderating impact of performance, the focal
firm’s prior performance was tested using a lagged
version of a standard profitability measure—the firm’s
return on sales (ROS). Likewise, rival prior performance was tested with a lagged measure of each rival’s
return on sales. To evaluate the impact of industry

leadership and similarity in industry standing, parallel
dichotomous variables were included, based on the
prior year’s market share for each company per industry. This approach follows Derfus et al. (2008). In their
study, they examine the contextual effect of market
position using an ordinal variable, ranking firms
based on market share percentage. Our industry leadership measure is also derived from market share percentage. The authors (Derfus et al., 2008, 67) theorize
about the dichotomous differences between “market
leaders and nonleaders” and constructed the ordinal
variable to test the hypotheses. In harmony, our variables capture this primary distinction between firms
consistently per industry. First, for industry leadership,
a dummy variable of market share leaders (share leader = 1 for the company with the largest share and zero
for all others) was included for each industry in the
previous year. And second, to capture similarity
between focal firm and rival, a dummy measure divides
industry competitors into leaders and nonleaders. All
competitors with less than the largest share in each
industry were assigned a nonleader distinction—a
point of similarity that may make focal firm and rival
more receptive to each other’s actions. The dummy
variable captured whether or not pairs of competitors
were similarly nonindustry leaders (nonleaders = 1
when neither pair-wise company has the largest share
and zero when either one of the pair has the largest
share).
Control variables
With every test of the hypotheses, a consistent set of
controls was employed. As a primary control variable,
the focal firm’s quick ratio is included as a proxy
measure of its slack resources to prevent the effects
associated with high liquidity from masking the
hypothesized effects on a firm’s future behavior
(Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992). Also, the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is included as a
control variable throughout. This commonly accepted
measure of industry concentration accounts for systematic differences associated with the level of concentration in the industry (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000).
As noted by Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, and Smith, “In
such environments (where industry concentration is
high), search and action will be less frequent, and so
it is easier for firms to learn and to comprehend the
consequences of their actions” (2008, p. 65). The HHI
variable controls for any such effects associated with
concentration. Finally, to distinguish the effect of one
behavioral driver from the other (experience and imitation), a lagged control variable of total marketing activity is included in each test reciprocally—for Hypothesis
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation table for firm–industry (n = 310) and firm–rival dyadic data set (n = 1732).
Firm–industry data set (n = 310)

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1
2
3
4
5

Quick ratio
Industry concentration
Aggregate industry marketing activity lag
Firm performance lag
Firm marketing activity lag

0.6
0.2
33.7
0.0
7.0

0.5
0.2
29.9
0.1
7.0

1.00
0.09
−0.33*
0.14*
−0.05

1.00
−0.31*
0.16*
0.21*

1.00
−0.24*
0.38*

Mean
6.1
6.2
0.6
0.2
6.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.7

SD
6.8
6.6
0.5
0.1
6.6
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.5

1
1.00
0.81*
−0.23*
0.24*
0.44*
0.01
−0.08*
−0.03
−0.26*

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Firm-rival dyadic data set (n = 1732)
Firm marketing activity
Firm marketing activity lag
Quick ratio
Industry concentration
Dyadic rival marketing activity lag
Firm performance lag
Dyadic rival performance lag
Dyadic rival industry leader lag
Rival-firm similarity lag

1.00
−0.25*
0.23*
0.45*
0.02
−0.09*
−0.02
−0.24*

1.00
0.03
−0.26*
0.19*
0.07*
0.03
0.10*

1.00
0.22*
0.07*
0.08*
0.18*
−0.28*

1.00
−0.09*
0.02
0.32*
−0.24*

1.00
0.18*
0.00
−0.11*

1.00
0.13*
−0.11*

1.00
−0.64*

3a, a lag of rival total marketing activity was included,
and for Hypotheses 3b and 4a–4c, a lag of firm total
marketing actions was included. In other words, when
testing the interactive effects of the focal firm’s own
prior marketing behavior, the prior marketing activity
of the industry was accounted for. Likewise, when testing for interactive rival effects, we controlled for the
focal firm’s own lagged marketing activity.
Statistical methods
In studies such as ours, with lagged values of the
dependent variable as regressor, there is a good chance
that both variables are correlated with some unobserved firm-specific attributes (Basdeo et al., 2006;
Godfrey, 1997). To account for idiosyncratic firm
effects, fixed-effects regression models are often used
for analyses (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; Halaby, 2004),
and significant results of the Hausman test (p < .001)
confirm that fixed-effects procedures should be used in
our case (Godfrey, 1997; Halaby, 2004). The attributes
of our data further specify negative binomial fixed-

Figure 2. Hypothesized model of reflexive and selective behaviors.

4

1.00
0.13*

5

1.00

effects regression be employed. Particularly, zeroinflated negative binomial fixed-effects regression is
specified for tests of discrete dependent variables that
are overly dispersed, with high occurrences of zero
values (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). Our data of discrete
counts of firm marketing activity have a mean of 12.1
and variance of 108; and the Vuong test (Greene, 2003,
pp. 751–752) confirmed that the zero-inflated framework was favored. Therefore, the count of actions is
predicted by negative binomial regression with a zero
inflation model to address excess zeroes, inflated by
industry concentration. The fit of the estimates to the
data is consistently good.
The descriptive statistics and correlations are shown
in Table 1. We observed no unexpectedly high correlations among independent variables.

Results
The variables used to operationalize the hypothesized
relationships just described are modeled in Figure 2.
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Table 2. Regression on firm marketing activity.
Quick ratio
Industry concentration
Firm marketing activity lag
Hypothesis 1
Aggregate industry marketing activity lag
Hypothesis 2
Dyadic rival marketing activity lag

Model 1

Model 2

−0.083
(0.089)
1.602
(0.289)**
0.081
(0.006)**
0.010
(0.002)**

−0.066
(0.088)
1.642
(0.293)**
0.098
(0.009)**
0.010
(0.002)**

Firm performance lag

Model 3

−0.372
(0.047)**
1.152
(0.141)**
0.097
(0.003)**

0.028
(0.003)**

0.023
(0.008)**
0.330
(0.659)

2.469
(1.241)*

Firm performance lag
× Firm marketing activity lag
Hypothesis 3a
Firm performance lag
× Dyadic rival marketing activity lag
Hypothesis 3b
Dyadic rival performance lag

−0.241
(0.092)**
−0.093
(0.063)
−0.650
(0.620)

Dyadic rival performance lag
× Dyadic rival marketing activity lag
Hypothesis 4a
Rival industry leader lag

−0.070
(0.058)
−0.365
(0.110)**

Rival industry leader lag
× Dyadic rival marketing activity lag
Hypothesis 4b
Rival-firm similarity lag
Rival-firm similarity lag
× Dyadic rival marketing activity lag
Hypothesis 4c
Constant
Log likelihood
LR chi2 (d.f.)
Observations

Model 4

−0.436
(0.045)**
1.008
(0.129)**
0.099
(0.003)**

0.016
(0.009)*
−0.273
(0.075)**

0.405
(0.138)**
−790.54
268.51 (4)
310

0.234
(0.154)
−787.20
275.18 (6)
310

0.787
(0.048)**
−4166.09
1495.72 (4)
1732

0.026
(0.008)**
0.933
(0.087)**
−4125.43
1529.90 (12)
1732

Note. One-tailed test of significance: *p < .05; **p < .01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 test H1, H2, and H3a using the
firm–industry data set; models 3 and 4 test H3b, H4a, H4b, and H4c using the firm-rival dyadic data set.

The test of the hypotheses returned consistent support
for the main effects of both the focal firm and rival
prior levels of competitive activity on future firm activity level, providing evidence of the existence of reflexive
competitive behavior. There is also support for selective
behavior in the influence of certain contextual factors.
Regression results are shown in Table 2.
Beginning with Model 1, there is support for
Hypothesis 1 with significance of the main effect of
firm prior marketing activity on subsequent firm marketing activity (beta = 0.081; p < .01). The regression
results also illustrate that prior rival marketing activity
had a significant effect on the firm’s subsequent marketing activity (beta = 0.010; p < .01). Hypothesis 2 is
therefore also supported. Taken together, the results
from Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 provide evidence
that the focal firm behaves reflexively regarding its level
of marketing activity.
Now turning to the hypotheses regarding selective
behavior, Hypothesis 3a, the moderating effect of focal
firm performance on the relationship between prior
firm activity and subsequent firm activity, is supported

(beta = −0.241; p < .01); these results are found in
Model 2. Graphical representation of the interaction
may provide useful visual information in support the
hypothesis. Figure 3 depicts the two-way effect of firm
performance and prior activity level on the firm’s subsequent activity level. All variables are at their mean
except the interacted variables. As illustrated, the curves
demonstrate that subsequent activity of high performing firms is less tied to prior activity level. The effect of
rivals, as in Hypothesis 3b, however, is not supported.
Specifically, we hypothesized a negative significant
influence of focal firm’s performance on the relationship between a rival’s past activity and the focal firm’s
subsequent activity (beta = −0.093; p < .10).
We next turn to Hypothesis 4 regarding the other
drivers of the firm’s selective competitive behavior.
Beginning with Hypothesis 4a, we argued that rival performance, as a contextual factor, would positively moderate the relationship between prior rival marketing
activity and subsequent firm marketing activity. As
reported in Model 4, the moderating effect of rival performance on the relationship was not significant. That is,
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Figure 3. Graph of interaction effect of prior firm activity level and performance on firm activity level.

the influence of rivals as models of behavior for the focal
firm was not significantly altered by the prior performance of rivals. Hypothesis 4a is therefore not supported.
The tests concerning the industry leadership of rivals
and similarity in industry standing, Hypotheses 4b and
4c, show evidence of selective behavior. With regard to
industry leadership, the interaction between the variables for rival industry leader and rival marketing activity was significantly positive (beta = 0.016; p < .05). The
results therefore indicate that rival industry leadership
strengthened the relationship between the prior marketing activity of that rival and the focal firm’s subsequent marketing activity. Hypothesis 4b is supported.
Figure 4 depicts the interaction of rival’s industry leadership and prior activity level on focal firm activity

level. Prior activity of industry leaders demonstrated
greater influence on the focal firm than did other rivals.
This is consistent with Hypothesis 4b.
The final test of selective competitive behavior,
similarity in industry standing between the focal
firm and pairwise rivals, yielded significant results.
The interaction of rival–firm similarity on the relationship between rival prior marketing activity and
the focal firm’s future marketing activity was significantly positive (beta = 0.026; p < .01). Hypothesis 4c
is therefore supported. Figure 5, showing the twoway effect of similarity of industry standing and prior
activity level of pairwise rivals on focal firm activity
level, offers visual support of the hypothesis. The
results indicate that similarity in industry standing

Figure 4. Graph of interaction effect of prior dyadic rival activity level and industry leadership on firm activity level.

Figure 5. Graph of interaction effect of prior dyadic rival activity level and pairwise similarity in industry standing on firm activity level.
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between firm and rival augments the influence of the
rival’s prior marketing activity on the focal firm’s
subsequent marketing activity. In the discussion section that follows, we consider the implications of
these results.

Discussion
This study examined an important set of questions in
strategic management literature concerning the extent
to which firm behavior is reflexive or automatic versus
selective and more unpredictable. Will a firm emulate
the past, being as active as it has been or being as active
as others around it? Will contextual factors, driven by
the firm’s awareness, motivation, and capability, influence the firm’s subsequent behavior? The findings support the core conceptual arguments on the reflexive
nature of firm behavior, and support our contention
that there is also selectivity among firms within the
context of rivals. Specifically, our study demonstrates
that the influence of the firm’s prior experience with
actions and the effect of rivals’ actions on future actions
are moderated by the focal firm’s prior performance, as
well as the rivals’ similarity and industry standing. We
therefore advance the conversation of prior experience
and imitation beyond routine-based, reflexive behavior
as theorized in routine-based and institutional literature to include the moderating influence of context on
the relationships between firm and rival activity.
Our study both confirms earlier research and carves a
new path. Consistent with earlier studies that conceptualized firm behavior as a passive and deterministic
process, our analysis shows that reflexive behavior that
occurs automatically through a firm’s own experience
and through broad imitation of their rivals’ levels of
behavior is indeed occurring. Specifically, we found evidence that there is a tendency to reflexively repeat prior
activity in support for Hypothesis 1, which argued for a
positive relationship between prior focal firm marketing
activity and subsequent firm marketing activity.
Similarly, our results indicate imitative behavior as reflex
to the activity of rivals. This finding supports our contention in Hypothesis 2 that prior rival marketing activity will be positively related to subsequent firm
marketing activity. While these baseline results to some
extent primarily replicate previous research findings,
they provide evidence of the validity of our approach
and set up the logic for exploring the contextual boundary conditions in later hypotheses. We also make a contribution by empirically examining and demonstrating
the impact of both experience-driven and imitation-driven behavior together within the same study.

Importantly, we add richness to the literature by
demonstrating that firms are not wholly bound to
repeating their past behavior by clinging to the behavioral lessons of their own and their rivals’ activity.
Our test shows evidence of a more selective decision
process. In support of Hypothesis 3, the tests yield
findings that a firm’s capability, as determined by its
own prior performance, moderates the influence the
firm’s past has on its future marketing activity. We
argued in Hypothesis 3a that through their humanagent managers, high-performing firms are more capable of overcoming the tendency to reflexively succumb to repetition and inertia of their own past
activity. Support for the hypothesis counters an alternate perspective of persistent repetition and inertia
that hardens with increasing performance. This finding is important because it contributes to a nascent
area of research investigating the antecedents of firm
heterogeneity (Smith & Cao, 2007). We also provide
insight and empirical support to recent theories of
organizational learning that argue for the feedback
effect of firm performance on learning (Zollo &
Winter, 2002). These studies contend that higher performing firms are more aware of the implications of
and causal links between their actions and resulting
outcomes and therefore are better able to direct their
cognitive effort more explicitly. Our empirical examination seems in harmony with their rationale.
Particularly, the results of Hypothesis 3 suggest that
these high-performing firms can be discerning in their
behavior as it relates to the levels of marketing activity
of others, as well as to their own past activity level.
That managers may direct the firm’s awareness and
level of motivation to particular rivals as behavioral models is important as it highlights the power of the AMC
perspective in furthering our understanding predicting
competitive rival behavior. Specifically, our arguments in
Hypothesis 4, regarding the positive influence of rival
performance, rival industry leadership, and similarity in
industry standing on the relationship between rival marketing activity and firm subsequent marketing activity,
are generally supported. While rival firm performance
did not seem to have an effect, rival industry leadership
and rival–firm similarity in industry standing did
strengthen the positive relationship between rival firm
prior marketing activity and focal firm future marketing
activity. This is consistent with Abrahamson and
Rosenkopf’s (1997) findings of a selective reputationenhanced, bandwagon effect. Their simulation of bandwagon pressures also investigated the influence of contextual factors. In their test, reputation significantly
amplified the relationship between the behavior of the
firm and the behavior of salient, reputable others.
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The empirical approach of our study allowed for the
examination of a more nuanced selective relationship
between firm and rival that is beyond the reach of extant
aggregated industry studies, in at least two respects. First,
where the tests of the traditional aggregated data set support the notion that the focal firm factors in the actions of
those around it, the dyadic data set reveals which rival
behaviors are more salient and more influential to the
firm than others. We, in effect, have uncovered boundaries to imitative behavior, or the influence of others. In
terms of Lane and Lubatkin’s (1998) work on firm similarity, our results suggest some degree of related influence
that is biased toward like-rivals and those of high industry
standing. Second, our study may provide insight into the
impact of shifting competitive landscapes on firms’ pairwise selective tendencies. Since we examined firms in the
sample longitudinally, the findings here suggest that these
behaviors hold up to changing environmental conditions
and time heterogeneity. As the environments within the
firms’ respective industries undoubtedly experienced
some changes over time, it seems we have supporting
evidence that the influence of contextual factors persisted.
Our study also directly advances the emerging research
on competitor analysis (Chen, 1996). Specifically, the use of
the AMC perspective and the empirical findings of the
present research reinforce the idea that future firm behavior
is predictable. By adding the notion of selectivity we also
show that predicting rival future behavior is more complicated than simply studying a firm’s past behavior or the
behavior of its rivals. In particular, assessing the level of
awareness, motivation, and capability of a firm might lead
to a more accurate prediction of its future behavior. For
example, just being able to differentiate those rivals who act
reflexively versus selectively could prove important to managers attempting to design future actions vis-à-vis specific
rivals. Future research might explore the extent to which
the findings of this research hold up for other types of
actions, for example, pricing, alliance, cooperative, or
other nonmarketing behaviors.
Beyond the contributions already listed, this study
also contributes to management research by introducing
the pair-wise examination of firm activity as a methodological tool to unearth more subtle relationships among
direct rivals. Future studies, however, might also make
contributions to the research through a qualitative
approach. Field studies could more explicitly expose
the internal processing that leads to selective behavior
—including capabilities and focus of managers engaged
in directing the firm’s competitive processes. For
instance, in a multinational field study, Bingham and
Eisenhardt (2011) deconstructed the development of
firm behaviors from the vantage point of investors, partners, and country-specific experts. Their research found
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that consistent developmental processes are active in
shared, cooperative relationships. However, additional
field study that went further to expose internal processes
that link firms to rivals would yield additional insight
into the mechanisms that ultimately generate variations
in firm activity levels.
Our empirical investigation into variation in competitive behavior tests the overarching hypothesis that
firms go beyond simply repeating the past or the activity levels of others to instead engage in selective behavior. The findings indicate that not only is a firm
impacted by the past, but through its awareness, motivation, and capability, a firm is also influenced by
certain contextual factors. In sum, firm behavior is
both reflexive and selective. Importantly, we find the
effect of prior competitive behavior on future behavior
is moderated by the firm’s own prior performance, and
that imitation of rivals has important selective components, including the industry standing and similarity of
rivals. Taken together, these results offer useful insight
into competitive interaction. Specifically, the findings
in this investigation, especially as they relate to selective
behaviors, offer evidence that firms in competitive
environments indeed distinguish or select particular
rivals as potential imitation targets.
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